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Abstract
Using an original dataset describing the career history of some 16,000 senior executives and mem-
bers of the non-executive board of US, UK, French and German companies, we investigate gender
differences in the use of social networks and their impact on earnings. There is a large gender
wage gap: women (who make up 8.8% of our sample) earned average salaries of $168,000 in 2008,
only 70% of the average $241,000 earned by men. This is not due to differences in age, experience
or education levels. Women are more likely than men to be non-executives, whose salaries are
lower; nevertheless, a substantial gender gap still exists among executives. We construct measures
of the number of currently influential people each individual has encountered previously in his or
her career. We find that executive men’s salaries are an increasing function of the number of such
individuals they have encountered in the past while women’s are not. Controlling for this discrep-
ancy, there is no longer a significant gender gap among executives. These findings are robust to
the use of different years, to the use of salaried versus non-salaried remuneration, and to the use of
panel estimation to control rigorously for unobserved individual heterogeneity. In contrast to exec-
utives, the salaries of non-executive board members do not display a significant gender wage gap,
nor any gender difference in the effectiveness with which men and women leverage their links into
salaries. This suggests that adoption of gender quotas for board membership, as has been enacted
or proposed recently in several European countries, is unlikely to reduce the gender gap in earn-
ings so long as such quotas do not distinguish between executive and non-executive board members.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The puzzle: gender gaps in top executive positions
In spite of several decades of substantial increase in women’s participation in the labor force in in-
dustrialized countries, the representation of women in senior corporate positions remains extremely
marginal, and the phenomenon of the ”glass ceiling” continues to puzzle researchers and lay com-
mentators alike. Although women represent 51.4% of what the US Bureau of Labor Statistics calls
”Management, professional and related occupations”, they make up only 15.7% of board members,
and just 3% of chief executive officers, of Fortune 500 companies1. Apart from the underrepresen-
tation of women at the very top, empirical studies have also shown that, even for those who reach
the top, substantial gender differences in earnings still exist. Among the determinants of the gender
gap in earnings in top corporate positions, various authors have proposed a gender difference in
seniority and in career interruptions (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Noonan et al., 2006; Bertrand
et al., 2010), a gender difference in the size of firms and their sector (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001;
Skalpe, 2007), the existence of discrimination (Selody, 2010), the fact that women are less likely to
hold the very top positions (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Elkinawy and Stater, 2011) or a gender
difference in the structure of compensation (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2006; Yurtoglu and Zulehner,
2009; Kulich et al., 2009).
1.2 A possible explanation: gender differences in the impact of social
networks
Social networks and job-related benefits One aspect that has not been sufficiently studied
from the point of view of gender is the role of the elite network structure of the individuals holding
top corporate positions. A person who sits on a company board may sit on several other boards and
may be an executive in one (or several) of the corresponding firms (or may have been an executive
at a previous time). Each such individual typically also has personal connections to board members
in other companies. Recruitment to board positions often takes place through an informal process,
typically involving the role of both professional headhunters and word of mouth recommendations.
The pioneering work of Granovetter (1973) has highlighted the importance of social connections
in obtaining both jobs and job-related advantages. Recruitment to board-level positions seems
particularly likely to give value to such informal connections. According to Granovetter, the social
connections that are the most valuable when looking for a job are not the closest ones but the
more distant ones. Strong ties, such as close friends and relatives, are more likely to have similar
1See Seabright, 2012, chapter 5. The figure of 51.4% is for 2009, the statistics on Fortune 500 companies are for
2010.
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information concerning job opportunities, while weak ties, such as acquaintances and coworkers,
are more likely to move in different social circles and to have access to different information about
job and other opportunities. It seems likely therefore, that the structure of social networks may
affect the extent to which individuals may be able to use their connections for professional ben-
efit. The value of such connections for individuals in top corporate positions has been confirmed
empirically by a number of studies (Geletkancycz et al., 2001; Brown et al., 2008; Horton et al.,
2009; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Engelberg et al., 2009; Liu, 2010; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011; Berardi
and Seabright, 2011), though as far as we are aware ours is the first study to examine the impact
of gender. As a result, if men and women differ in terms of the size or the composition of their
networks (and particularly in terms of the relative importance of strong and weak ties), or in the
way in which they use these networks for professional advancement, it seems plausible that this
may have a systematic impact on the gender composition of positions for which such networks
important in the recruitment process.
Gender differences in social networks The question whether men and women differ in the
structure of their social networks has been investigated in the sociological and psychological liter-
atures (Baumeister and Sommer, 1997; Benenson, 1993; Friebel and Seabright, 2011). However,
there is little agreement about the extent of any systematic differences (see Seabright, 2012, chapter
7, for an overview). Scholars have also had difficulty distinguishing between the relative importance
of gender differences in preferences, as opposed to difference in opportunities and constraints, for
forming and using social connections (Moore, 1990; Fisher and Oliker, 1983). Nevertheless, there
is suggestive evidence that women may tend to rely relatively more on small social networks of
strong relationships, while men will tend to build larger groups with weaker types of relationship.
This is consistent with evidence from primatology and evolutionary psychology, based on the hy-
pothesis that coalitions reflect different reproductive strategies in prehistory (Low, 2000, chapter
11). However, even if the hypothesis that male and female networks differ systematically is empiri-
cally confirmed, this is compatible with other, cultural explanations for the origin of the divergence.
Gender differences in social networks within firms The idea that there might be gender
differences in social network composition and use has received some support from the managerial
literature. In the workplace, women’s connections seem to be built in order to respond strategically
to the different constraints they face, such as a legitimacy problem (Burt, 1998) or their under-
representation in top positions (Ibarra, 1993, 1997). There is also evidence that preferences play a
role, such as homophily (a preference for interacting with similar others, such as others of same sex
(see McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 2001). It seems likely that homophily will compound the effect
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of female underrepresentation, leading women’s networks to differ from males’ ones. However, the
crucial question is whether women reap different job-related benefits from their connections, or
whether the differences from those of men are of little relevance to their career advancement.
Women’s connections at the very top Several studies based on interviews of top corporate
individuals reveal that women appear lack the relevant informal connections to access top positions
(Linehan and Scullion, 2008; Lyness and Thompson, 2000; Metz and Tharenou, 2001) and reap
lower benefits in terms of career outcomes from their social networks (Bu and Roy, 2005; Tattersall
and Keogh; Forret and Dougherty, 2004). However, studies in this literature mainly rely on surveys
(and are thus inevitably subjective). The surveys are also of relatively few individuals, most of
the time from a single organization. Our purpose in this paper is to investigate the influence of
social networks for men and women in top corporate jobs from a statistical point of view using a
substantially larger sample of individuals than has hitherto been possible.
1.3 Methodology, results and outline of the paper
In order to do so, our work is based on a large data set of more than 90 000 individuals working
in high positions in almost 4 000 American and European firms over a 12 year period (from 1997
to 2009). This original data set allowed us to create social networks measures based on university
ties, association ties and employment ties, contrary to the majority of studies on social networks
which only rely on directorship links (Horton et al., 2009; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). We want
to understand whether individuals’ links (the number of other individuals with whom they have
previously been in contact) affect their career history.
We construct measures of the number of currently influential people each individual has encoun-
tered previously in his or her career, and we find evidence that men and women make different use
of links with such people. In particular, executive men leverage these links more effectively on av-
erage than women, in the sense that men’s salaries are an increasing function of the number of such
individuals they have encountered in the past while women’s are not. This discrepancy explains
the full gender gap among executives, in that when we introduce these social network variables in
the analysis, the gender dummy is no longer significant in explaining executives’ salaries. These
findings are robust to the use of different years, to the use of salaried versus non-salaried remunera-
tion, and to cross-section versus panel estimation. The proportion of other women among all links
moderates the networking effect: women do benefit from links with other women. In contrast to
executives, the salaries of non-executive board members do not display a significant gender wage
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gap, nor any gender difference in the relation of wages to links. This suggests that adoption of
gender quotas for board membership, as has been enacted or proposed recently in several European
countries, is unlikely to reduce the gender gap in earnings so long as such quotas do not distinguish
between executive and non-executive board members.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on the
data set and the methodology used. Section 3 presents results. Robustness checks are conveyed in
Section 4. A dynamic panel analysis is investigated in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 Data Description
The analysis is based on an original dataset describing the career history of more than 90 000
executives and members of the non-executive board of US, UK, French and German companies
between 1997 and 2009. The dataset was provided to us by BoardEx Ltd, a UK supplier of data to
headhunting companies. BoardEx’s own proprietary database (which we refer to hereafter as the
”main” database) consists of information about some 380,000 individuals who are current or past
board members or senior executives of European and US companies. The database provided to us,
however, consists of the subset of their main database for which salary data are available at least
for some years between 1997 and 2009. For firms to be included in the BoardEx main database,
they require a market capitalization above 1 million USD . There are 4940 firms in our dataset, and
for each firm we have information about all board members; for firms with fewer than five board
members we have information on the five most highly salaried executives where salary information
exists. The dataset contains information about individuals’ demographic characteristics such as
age, nationality and gender, about individuals’ employment history such as earnings and position,
about individuals’ education characteristics such as degree obtained, field and university, and about
firms’ characteristics such as market capitalization, sector or number of employees.
The main originality of this data set is that we also have information relevant to individuals’
social networks. However, it’s important to clarify the characteristics of this information since they
affect the inferences that can be drawn from our results. Ideally, in order to study the impact
of top business people’s social networks on their career, in terms of remuneration or promotion,
we would like to have information on their active social contacts. Unfortunately, this kind of in-
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formation is extremely difficult to obtain for significant numbers of individuals. Most studies of
social networks in a business context (see Linehan and Scullion, 2008; Metz and Tharenou, 2001;
Tattersall and Keogh, 2006; Forret and Dougherty, 2004) have conducted interviews and collected
detailed information about a relatively small number of individuals and their active networks of
contacts; these subjects are often employees of the same firm or users of the same professional
network (which raises questions about selection). We do not have such data. Instead we have
information, based on matching individuals’ re´sume´s, about which other members of the BoardEx
main database a given individual has overlapped with in the course of his or her career. This is
effectively a list of ”influential people” with whom any given individual has had an opportunity to
interact; whether that interaction has been actively pursued is evidently not something we are in
a position to observe. We can observe three categories of overlap: whether two individuals were at
university at the same time, whether they worked for the same firm at the same time, and whether
they have been involved in not-for-profit organizations at the same time. Definitions of our vari-
ables are given in Table 1 and summary statistics in Table 2 for the year 2008. In what follows we
use the variable name ”Links” to refer to the number of members of the BoardEx main database
with whom an individual in our dataset has worked in the same firm at the same time. The main
explanatory variable we shall use in the analysis that follows will be called ”Weighted links” since
we shall weight each link by the reciprocal of one plus the number of years since the two individuals
worked together; when we do not use this weighting procedure we shall call our explanatory variable
”Unweighted links”. Notice that the links are not necessarily to other individuals in our dataset,
which would arbitrarily restrict our measure of the size of individuals’ networks by whether or not
we have salary information about the members of that network.
Data on both salaries and links are frequently missing in our dataset. In particular, educational
links and not-for-profit links are more often missing than employment links, so the regression re-
sults we report use only employment links. In addition we often find zero reported salaries for
some years, and have difficulty knowing whether this means that the data are not available or that
the individual concerned literally drew no salary in the year in question. Our main analysis is
conducted on a subset of 16204 individuals for whom all salary and employment network data are
available in 2004 and 2008 and all salaries are strictly positive in 2008. For our panel estimation
we have to restrict attention for reasons of data availability to a subset of 4251 individuals. Table
2 illustrates summary statistics for our sample of 16204 compared to all individuals for whom we
have observations for the variable in question. Our sample has slightly higher mean number of
links and salary than the rest of the dataset, and a substantially lower proportion of women (8.8%
as opposed to 12.4% in the whole dataset). While there is evidently a possibility of selection bias,
including survivorship bias, we have no idea of its direction, and no reason to expect the bias to be
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different for men and women.
For our econometric estimations we use as explanatory variables measures of the overall num-
bers of links, our principal measure being a weighted sum of links in which each link is weighted by
the inverse of the number of years since the individuals last overlapped plus one (other measures
of the importance of links could also be envisaged, and will be explored in future work). However,
a more complete understanding of the role of social networks on individuals’ career, would involve
computing more precise network measures such as degree (extent of interaction with other mem-
bers of the whole network), betweenness (extent to which the individual is a key intermediary) and
closeness (extend to which the individual is free from dependence on other members of the net-
work), especially in terms of employment contacts. Studies that have used such measures include
those reported in Geletkancycz et al. (2001), Liu (2010) and Renneboog and Zhao (2011).
2.2 Independent and Control Variables
Our measures of individuals’ career outcomes for the purposes of this paper are various indicators
of remuneration. Individuals’ earnings are represented by three components: salary (base annual
pay in thousands of USD), liquid wealth (sum of the value of shares held and the intrinsic value of
exercisable options in thousands of USD) and total wealth (sum of equity held, estimated value of
options held and long term incentive programs held in thousands of USD). For our main outcome
regressions we focus on salary. More precisely, because individuals may have several jobs each year,
we compute a variable ”total salary”, corresponding to the sum of salaries of all the jobs for each
year for each individual. Total salary is the independent variable in the analysis, mainly because
there are fewer ambiguities about its measurement. Nevertheless, we are also interested to know
whether our findings are robust to the inclusion of non-salary measures of compensation. As we
shall see, there are important differences between men and women in terms of the proportion of to-
tal remuneration provided via salary and other mechanisms, a finding that matches what has been
reported previously in the literature (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2006; Yurtoglu and Zulehner, 2009;
Kulich et al., 2009). As will be seen below, our conclusions are strengthened when the analysis is
conducted on non-salary compensation measures.
As control variables, we use demographic variables (gender, age and age squared) and education
variables (highest degree obtained and field of study). We describe below our estimation methods
that attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals.
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3 Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We report summary statistics and econometric results principally for the year 2008, the most re-
cent year for which we have relatively complete data (but we also verify robustness of the results
using the year 2007). The idea is to understand to what extent differences in individuals’ links can
explain differences in their salaries, controlling for other explanatory variables. To avoid problems
of endogeneity, the links are measured in the year 2004, and we restrict our analysis to the 16,204
individuals for whom we have complete salary and network data in 2004 and strictly positive salary
in 2008. 8.8 % of these individuals are women. 47% are executives and 78% held a directorship
in 2008 (individuals may be executive board members, non-executive board members or executives
who are not board members).
On average, women in our dataset are younger than men (56 years old against 58 years old
in 2008). They have a slightly more advanced educational background: 24% of women have a
Bachelors degree, 39% have a Masters degree and 28% have a PhD; while the percentages for men
are respectively 26%, 37% and 24%. The higher the degree, the higher the percentage of women
who hold the degree compared to men. Roughly 68% of men and 78% of women hold at least
two degrees. The distribution of men’s and women’s degrees between business and science subjects
are similar, but almost twice as many men as women hold a degree in finance. Overall, the broad
human capital of men and women do not seem very different among the individuals in our dataset.
A slight educational difference in favor of women is offset by a difference in favor of men in terms
of work experience: men have spent an average of just over 11.8 years in the organization as com-
pared to 9.4 years for women. This is not more than would be expected, though, given the average
difference in age.
Our measures of links reveal that women in 2008 have somewhat more of these on average than
men - 282 links as against 231 for men (the same is true of the lagged values from 2004 we use in
the regressions). This may be related to the fact that women tend to work in larger firms than
men (a mean of 26,000 employees compared to a mean of 19,000 for men, and with a mean market
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capitalization around 50% higher than that of the firms in which the men in our sample work)2.
So women are clearly not at any disadvantage in terms of their overall number of links. See the
appendix for more detailed statistics on network measures by gender.
However, there are very striking differences in employment outcomes by gender. In terms of
total salary (the sum of salaries from all jobs, where there was more than one), women earned
on average $168,000 in 2008, while men earned on average $241,000 (the corresponding median
earnings are $89,000 for women and $146,000 for men). Looking at Figure 1 we see that this dif-
ference in total salary narrows slightly but remains large over time. These earnings differences are
even larger for liquid wealth and total wealth. In common with what has been previously found in
the literature, women are less likely to hold executive positions, and very unlikely to hold senior
positions such as CEO or Chairman of the Board. 4% of our women board members (already a
small minority of the dataset) hold CEO positions as against 15% of the men.
Figure 1: Total salary evolution by gender
2The corresponding median figures are 6778 employees for women as against 4000 for men, and $2.2 billion
capitalization as against $1.4 billion for men.
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3.2 Preliminary Analysis
We want to understand whether social networks have an impact on individuals’ career outcomes.
We focus on the year 2008 and on the impact of employment links on earnings. There is a risk
of simultaneity bias because of reverse causality. For example, while those individuals with more
links in 2008 might as a result have higher salaries in 2008, it might also be true that individuals
changing employment in pursuit of higher salaries in 2008 acquire a larger network of contacts in
2008. We therefore use lagged explanatory variables, with employment links in 2004 instead of
employment links in 20083.
Table 3 reports regressions of total salary in 2008 on links in 2004 plus a gender dummy and
controls for age, age squared, degree level and degree field (in fact, we use dummy variables for
bachelors, masters and PhD degrees and for the fields of business, science, social science and fi-
nance). We do not use sectoral controls or controls for firm size or other characteristics since these
are likely to be endogenous to individual choices and constitute part of the outcomes that we are
seeking to explain (if, for example, women earn lower salaries because they work for firms of a
certain kind we would like to know why they work for relatively low-paying firms)4.
The model specification is then:
ln(salaryi) = β1 + β2ln(lagged salaryi) + β3ln(lagged linksi) + β4femalei
+ β5femalei ∗ ln(lagged linksi) + β6agei + β7age2i + β8degreei
+ β9degree fieldi + i (1)
The first column shows that links are very significantly correlated with total salary. The elastic-
ity of 8.8% implies that, of two otherwise identical individuals one of whom has 250 links while the
other has 350 (an increase of 33 log points, less than half a standard deviation more), the individual
with 350 links should have a 3% salary advantage over the individual with 250. This is not a very
large effect but as we shall see, this average hides significant variations among sub-groups, for some
3We have also undertaken IV regressions with similar results, using employment links in 2004 as an instrument
for employment links in 2008.
4We did not include country dummies in the regressions as we consider that the market for executives and board
members is international. However, including country dummies does not change the overall picture of the results.
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of whom the effect may indeed be large.
Although our use of lagged links instead of current links should remove endogeneity problems
due to reverse causality, we cannot rule out the possibility that there are unobserved character-
istics of individuals that determine both the size of their networks and the size of their salary.
Suppose, for instance, that job mobility is related to entrepreneurial dynamism: then individuals
who accumulate more links through more frequent changes of job may also independently have the
talent to earn higher salaries. There is no perfect way of dealing with this problem, which has
not been fully resolved to our knowledge in previous studies of the impact of networks on labor
market outcomes5. We shall report results from estimation strategies of two main kinds, which
yield qualitatively similar results though with some differences as to the magnitude of the respec-
tive coefficients. One possibility, explored in the second and third columns of Table 3, is to enter
the lagged salary in 2004 as an independent control variable in the regression of salary in 2008, on
the theory that the unobserved individual characteristics that affect salaries in 2008 will also have
influenced salaries in 2004. There are disadvantages to this, which introduce possible biases. First,
salaries in 2004 may already be influenced by individual networks, so using this as a control variable
may remove too much of the influence of networks from the estimation, thereby biasing downward
the coefficients. Secondly, even if salaries in 2004 are related to unobserved characteristics, they
contain substantial measurement error so they will be imperfect proxy variables. Third, there may
be separate dynamics of individual salaries over time (they might, for instance, be mean-reverting
because of idiosyncratic shocks), so using lagged salary will not be able both to control for these
dynamics and control of unobserved individual heterogeneity. We return to this issue below in dis-
cussing our second estimation strategy, namely dynamic panel estimation. Nevertheless, we report
specifications both with and without controlling for salaries in 2004 in the results that follow.
In order to see whether there are different returns from links for men and women, we intro-
duce the interaction variable female*links. The second column of Table 3 includes only the gender
dummy, while the third column also includes the interaction with the links variable. Table 4 reports
the same three specifications as Table 3 but using the weighted measure of links, in which links are
weighted by the reciprocal of the number of years since the two individuals worked together plus
one. This variable is plausibly a more effective measure of the real importance of a person’s links
5Of the papers that have recognized this difficulty, Hwang and Kim (2009) use past performance as a proxy for
ability, which raises similar issues to our own procedure. Engelberg et al. (2009) use school and industry fixed-
effects, but these are not equivalent to individual fixed-effects, and in any case would have little relevance to gender
differences. Renneboog and Zhao (2011) use random effects estimation, which is unlikely to capture the unobserved
talent differences we are concerned with here.
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than the unweighted measure. In Tables 3 and 4 we report both measures but in subsequent Tables
we report only the results using weighted measures as these appear to be preferable on principle.
The central messages of Tables 3 and 4 are as follows. Using weighted rather than unweighted
links increases the measured influence of network opportunities by around 50%. Controlling for
lagged salary reduces the coefficient on links by about a third, so that the two adjustments more
or less cancel out, leaving the estimated elasticity of salary with respect to links at a little over 8%.
However, there is no evidence at all of different impacts of networks for women and men, since the
coefficient on the interaction of the gender dummy with links is both statistically insignificant and
economically negligible.
It appears, therefore, that the hypothesis that men and women leverage their links very dif-
ferently is not supported by the data at this level of aggregation. On the contrary, the negative
coefficient on the female dummy, which lies between 33 and 45 log points according to the particular
specification, seems to indicate the presence of a major salary disadvantage for women, controlling
for their other characteristics as far as we are able. However, the aggregation masks some important
differences between groups in the dataset, differences we shall now explore in more detail.
3.3 The Importance of Executive Status
Executives and non-executive directors are two very different populations among the senior employ-
ees of a company; they have very different roles within the company and also very different salaries.
Non-executives typically work part-time and may often hold several directorships simultaneously.
Although non-executive directors of one firm may hold executive positions in another, there is a
substantial population (making up over 50% of our dataset in fact) of individuals who hold only
non-executive positions. They have much lower salaries on average than executives (see Figure 2 for
year 2008 and Figure 3 for evolution over time). And many more of them are women (see Figure 4
and Figure 5). When comparing the salaries of men and women in our sample, it is essential to take
into account the fact that part of the gender gap is a composition effect: women are more likely to
be non-executives, who are in a lower-paid category. We cannot, of course, determine using these
data why women are more likely to be non-executives. It is possible that different preferences are
involved, since non-executive positions typically involve much more flexible working conditions. It
is also possible that discrimination is more significant in respect of executive positions, since it is
here that real power is exercised in the firm.
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As Table 5 reveals, only 32% of women in our dataset in 2008 are executives while 49% of
men are executives. Since non-executives earn only 28% as much on average as executives, this
indicates that it is important to examine gender differences separately within categories. Indeed,
female executives earn on average 17% less than their male counterparts, while the difference is
only 2% when we consider female non executives (see Figure 3 for a graphical representation); the
initial gender difference for non-executives clearly disappears over the period of the sample6.
Figure 2: Logarithm of total salary in 2008 by executive status
6It appears in Figure 3 as though the gender gap in earnings is declining over time for both executives and
non-executives. Unfortunately it is difficult to test this rigorously since there are different numbers of individuals
in different years due to missing observations. It is hard to know whether the apparent decline is a real effect or
an artefact of sample composition (for instance because in later years firms are included that may have smaller
gender gaps). We have tried plotting gender gaps for those individuals who are observed for all years over a given
period, and it appears overall that there is a real decline in the gap for non-executives and no decline for executives.
However, this is at the cost of substantially restricting the numbers of individuals, so we hesitate to generalize from
these tentative findings.
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Figure 3: Total salary evolution by executive status
Figure 4: Executive men and women in 2004 Figure 5: Non executive men and women in 2004
The influence of employment links might be very different for executives and non executives.
In particular, if they play a different role for men and women, it is among executives (where the
real gender gap exists) that we should expect to find the evidence. Figure 6 provides a striking
confirmation of this hypothesis. We have divided the sample of executive individuals first by gender
and secondly according to their network size, with ”Large Network” referring to those individuals
who have weakly more than the median of the link distribution of all individuals in 2004, and
”Small Network” referring to those who have strictly less than the median. For each group we plot
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the mean annual salary for each year from 2000 to 2008. First, for a given size of network, men
always have higher salary than comparable women. Secondly, the size of networks makes much
more difference to the salaries of men than to those of women. Women with large networks earn
a little more than women with small networks, whereas men with large networks earn a lot more
than men with small networks7.
Figure 6: Salary evolution by network size and gender
Tables 6 and 7 test these findings econometrically by reporting the results of separate estimation
of the determinants of salaries in 2008 for executives and non-executives. Four points stand out
from these tables.
• First, even without taking different number of links into account, the gender dummy for non-
executives is is completely insignificant. If there is a discrepancy between men and women
in respect of salaries, it is concentrated among executives. Indeed, it seems possible that in
the light of public discussion of gender imbalance in the boardroom, a number of firms may
be actively recruiting and advancing women to non-executive positions, without doing so to
anything like the same extent in respect of executive positions. It is among executives that
the gender gap is really striking, with a gap of 33 log points to women’s disadvantage.
7In case these average salary figures are distorted by the presence of a few very large earners in the sample we
have plotted the equivalent of Figure 6 (as well as Figures 7 and 8 below) using median earnings for each group.
These are available from the authors on request and show qualitatively similar results.
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• Secondly, the influence of links on salaries is substantially more important for non-executives
than for executives, with an estimated elasticity of 33% without controlling for lagged salary
and over 20% when lagged salary is controlled for. The elasticity on links for executives is
around 10% (and this is hardly affected at all by controlling for lagged salary). Being a
non-executive board member evidently requires and benefits from contacts to a substantially
greater extent than being an executive.
• Thirdly, among executives the interaction of the female dummy with links is now negative
and significant at the 10% level, and nearly cancels the positive coefficient on the uninteracted
network term. Put simply, this means that while executive men appear to transform their
employment links into higher salaries, women do not.
• Fourthly, once these differences in the effect of links are taken into account, the gender dummy
becomes insignificant in the executive equation as well.
Overall, therefore, it seems as though the extent of individuals’ networks makes a difference to
their salaries in a way that is unaffected by gender among non-executives but among executives is
beneficial only to men (consistently with the view that firms are making more efforts at recruitment
and advancement of female board members in non-executive than in executive roles; see Daily et
al.(1999) and Helfat et al.(2006)). One natural question is whether it makes a difference to what
extent women have networks composed of other women. A number of studies have highlighted a
positive impact of women in top positions on other women’s positions and earnings (Bell, 2005;
Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer, 2010), though they are not able to de-
termine the mechanism by which such an impact occurs. A possible explanation might appeal to
the role of social networks (for example, women in top positions might be mentoring and helping
other women in lower positions). Tables 8 and 9 therefore report the same specification as Tables 6
and 7, but with the addition of a variable representing the ratio of women among each individual’s
links.
The inclusion of this variable does not make much difference to the remaining coefficients (men’s
network opportunities still appear to benefit them while women’s do not). Non-executives appear
if anything to be harmed by having female contacts, but this effect disappears when we control for
lagged salary. Intriguingly, however, executives of either gender benefit from having women among
their contacts. Women appear to benefit more than men from this effect, but the standard errors
are high and the difference, though economically important, is not statistically significant. It’s not
at all clear what may be causing this effect. It may be that individuals with more women among
their links have for various reasons tended to work for firms that have a stronger team ethic and
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whose members are more likely to look after the interests of former colleagues. In the absence of
further evidence this can only remain a conjecture.
We now proceed to test the robustness of these findings in a variety of respects.
4 Robustness Checks
4.1 Year 2007
Table 10 shows that we get very similar results for salaries in the year 2007. The negative coefficient
on the interaction of links with the gender dummy is now significant at the 5% level.
4.2 Liquid Wealth and Total Wealth in 2008
Liquid wealth is the sum of the value of shares held and the intrinsic value of exercisable options
in thousands of USD. Total wealth is the sum of equity held, estimated value of options held and
long term incentive programs held in thousands of USD. We consider here again the totals from all
jobs held by individuals in 2008.
Figures 7 and 8 display the equivalents of Figure 6 for liquid and total wealth. Women with
large networks are at essentially no advantage compared to women with small networks, and both
are indistinguishable from men with small networks. For men with large networks, though, the
advantage is huge.
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Figure 7: Liquid wealth evolution by network size and gender
Figure 8: Total wealth evolution by network size and gender
Tables 11 through 14 test these findings econometrically, and confirm that they are even more
striking than those for salaries. Without controlling for lagged salaries or wealth, the elasticity of
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liquid wealth with respect to links is 32% for executives and 40% for non-executives; these elastic-
ities fall to 23% and 16% respectively when lagged wealth is controlled for (controlling for lagged
salary has a milder effect). The corresponding figures for total wealth are 61% and 55%, falling to
40% and 27% when lagged wealth is controlled for. To put this in perspective, an elasticity of 40%
would imply that an executive with 350 links instead of 250 would have 14% higher remuneration.
The negative coefficients on the interaction of links with the gender dummy in the equations
for executives are statistically significant at the 5% level for liquid wealth and at the 1% level for
total wealth, and large enough to offset most of the effect for males so that women’s return to links
is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This confirms once again a striking gender disparity in
the value of networks for remuneration among executives.
One potential reason why these gender disparities are even larger for liquid and total wealth
than for salary may lie lie in the way non-salary components of remuneration are determined.
Generally, the salary part of executive compensation is more transparently determined and often
tied to some market level reference. Liquid and total wealth are more likely to be determined by
a relatively opaque process of ad hominem bargaining (for once the gender-asymmetric term ”ad
hominem” appears justified). Following the argument of Babcock and Laschever (2003), women
may tend to negotiate less hard than men, so that gender differences in delayed compensation may
be larger than differences in the fixed part of compensation. Some corroboration of this conjecture
may be noted in the finding in Table 13 that the coefficient on the interaction of the gender dummy
with links is negative and about two-thirds the magnitude of the uninteracted coefficient. Although
it is statistically significant at only 15%, this is the first time we have found even mild evidence of
any gender gap among non-executives, and it is striking that this should be with respect to that
part of compensation that is determined by the most opaque and individual bargaining.
4.3 Oaxaca Decomposition
We use the Oaxaca decomposition technique in order to recover the part of the gap in total salary
which is due to gender differences in the magnitudes of the determinants of total salary (such as
links among others), from the part which is due to gender differences in the effects of these de-
terminants on total salary. These two parts are known as the ”endowment” and the ”coefficient”
effects respectively. The main difference with our estimations so far is that the Oaxaca technique
estimates separate equations for each group whereas our previous technique estimated a common
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equation except for the gender dummy and its interactions. Tables 15 to 18 present the results. The
gap in total salary seems to be explained mainly by different returns from determinants (such as
links) for executives, while for non executives, the gap in total salary seems to be mainly explained
by different magnitudes of the determinants themselves (age being the more important). For men,
returns to links are positive and significant at the 1% level while for women they are positive but
small and statistically completely insignificant. Again this reinforces strongly the conclusions of
our estimations so far.
5 Panel analysis
5.1 Model Specification
Using the panel nature of the data allows us to consider a more complex model in which we take
potential unobserved individual heterogeneity into account through individual fixed effects, and
also to separate this out from the intrinsic dynamics of salaries over time.
The model specification is now (for both executive and non-executive subsamples):
salaryit = αsalaryi,t−1 + βfemale linksi,t−1 + γmale linksi,t−1 + δgenderi
+ ζhuman capitalit + σtimet + uit (2)
with
uit = ηi + vit (3)
where ηi are the (unobserved) individual fixed effects.
The network variables are lagged to avoid simultaneity bias (due for instance to individuals’
changing jobs in pursuit of a higher salary and thereby acquiring larger networks). However, it
remains likely that the network and human capital variables, as well as the lagged salary term, will
be correlated with the individual fixed effects. Under these conditions the OLS estimator will not
be consistent and we shall need to use alternative estimators such as difference and system GMM
estimators. For these to be consistent, we need the idiosyncratic disturbances (apart from the
fixed effects) to be uncorrelated across individuals, so we include time dummies in order to remove
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as much as possible of this correlation from the data. However, the disturbance terms may have
individual-specific patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. We undertake the analysis
on the years 2000 to 2008 inclusive, so T is relatively small and the number of observations N is
relatively large (the executive sample is composed of 1,768 individuals, the non executive sample
is composed of 2,483 individuals).
5.2 Estimation Strategy
2SLS estimation To obtain a consistent estimate, one possibility is to apply a first-difference
transformation to the equation to eliminate the individuals’ fixed effects:
∆salaryit = α∆salaryi,t−1 + β∆female linksi,t−1 + γ∆male linksi,t−1 + ∆X ′itδ + ∆vit (4)
where X ′it include all the other exogenous regressors.
If we apply OLS regression on this transformed equation, we will still obtain inconsistent esti-
mates of α, β and γ. In fact, even if individuals’ fixed effects ηi are removed, the lagged salary is
still endogenous to the errors, since the yi,t−1 in ∆yi,t−1 is correlated with the vi,t−1 in ∆vit (the
same is true for the lagged links regressors). However, deeper lags of the lagged salary and lagged
links regressors remain orthogonal to the error and are available as instruments. We could then
apply a 2SLS estimation to the equation (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981). One additional assumption
is needed here (additionally to the assumption that the vit are independent across individuals and
serially uncorrelated): the initial conditions salaryi1, female linksi1 and male linksi1 have to be
uncorrelated with subsequent errors (initial conditions have to be predetermined). However, the
2SLS estimator is a good estimator only under homoskedasticity (and after differencing, ∆vit are
probably far from i.i.d.). Moreover, it is not asymptotically efficient, while the GMM estimator
will be.
GMM difference estimation The GMM difference estimator (Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen,
1988; Arrellano and Bond, 1991) is based on the fact that all the past lags available in the data
are used as instruments for the endogenous variables. To implement the feasible efficient GMM
estimator, we have to estimate the covariance matrix of the transformed errors. For the one-step
GMM estimator, the estimate of the covariance matrix is based on the assumption that the vit are
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i.i.d. However, it can be shown that the GMM estimator is still consistent under this (potentially
false) assumption. For the two-step GMM, we run the GMM regression twice, first assuming ho-
moskedasticity of errors and second, using the residuals from the first GMM regression to obtain
the estimate of the covariance matrix. In practice, researchers have more often used the one-step
estimator because efficiency gains from the two-step estimator are shown to be low even if errors
are heteroskedastic (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Blundell et al., 2001)
and the asymptotic distribution is less reliable due to the fact that the weighting matrix is based
on estimated parameters (Windmeijer, 1998 proposes a finite-sample correction for the asymptotic
variance of the two-step GMM estimator). As a result, it is not possible to make a choice between
the estimators on a priori grounds, so we report both one-step and two-step estimators.
GMM system estimation Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that if the variable salary (or the
links variables) is close to a random walk, then the GMM difference estimator performs poorly
because past levels provide little information about future changes, so that untransformed lags are
weak instruments for transformed variables. Let us rewrite the differenced model in the following
way:
∆salaryit = α
t−2∆salaryi2 +
t−3∑
s=0
αsβ∆female linksi,t−s +
t−3∑
s=0
αsγ∆male linksi,t−s
+
t−3∑
s=0
αsδ∆Xi,t−s +
t−3∑
s=0
αs∆ui,t−s (5)
where X ′ again include all the other exogenous regressors.
Here again, the main problem is the individual fixed effects ηi. However, we observe that
∆salaryit will be uncorrelated with ηi if and only if ∆salaryi2 is uncorrelated with ηi. Notice that
the same has to be true for the links variables as well. This will be satisfied if salary and links
variables follow a mean stationary process. As a result, the system GMM estimation (Arrellano and
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) combines the linear moment conditions for the differenced
model with the linear moment conditions for the model in levels. In other words, both equations 2
and 4 are simultaneously estimated in order to provide estimates of coefficient α, β, γ and δ.
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5.3 Results
We first test AR(1) models for salary and social network in order to see whether these processes
are close to random walks:
salaryit = λ
1salaryi,t−1 + ξ1( i) + µ
1
it (6)
networkit = λ
2networki,t−1 + ξ2( i) + µ
1
it (7)
Table 19 presents the results. We observe that links seem to be a persistent series, especially for
executives and also, to some extent, for non executives. Salary seems also to be fairly persistent for
the non executive sample. We thus need to use GMM system estimators. We present four different
GMM system estimators for the two subsamples of executives and non executives: one-step GMM
system estimator where all lags of salary and links instrument both equations (the one in difference
and the one in levels), one-step GMM system estimator where all the lags of salary instrument the
equation in difference and all the lags of links instrument both equations and their counterpart
two-step GMM estimators.
Tables 20 and 21 present the results for salary in 2008, for executive and non-executive samples
only. Table 22 presents one-step GMM system estimation for liquid and total wealth. The key
features of the panel results are as follows:
• The coefficient on links for male executives in the salary equations is significant at the 1%
level and large, with elasticities ranging from 13% to 33% depending on the instrument set
used.
• The coefficient on links for male executives in the wealth equations is significant at the 5%
level for liquid wealth and 10% level for total wealth and relatively large, with elasticities of
52% for liquid wealth and 55% for total wealth.
• The coefficient on links for female executives is positive but insignificant in the salary equa-
tions, and negative and not significant in the wealth equations.
• The coefficient on links for non-executives is positive and significant at 1% for both women and
men, with the coefficients slightly larger for women in the salary equations and substantially
larger in the wealth equations but not significative.
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• The tests of autocorrelation indicate that the series meet the requirements for GMM esti-
mation. In particular, the first order serial correlation of the error differences is negative
by construction (since each error term enters negatively into the difference of its successor
with itself and positively into its own difference with its predecessor). But the second order
serial correlations are insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that errors are serially
uncorrelated, as required by GMM estimation.
• However, all specifications reject the null under the Sargan test.
The results of the Sargan tests mean that we cannot take these results as conclusive. The most
likely reason is that some of the lagged values of the links variables are invalid instruments in
the sense that they should properly be included in the main estimating equation. This would be
plausible if, for example, some of the additions to an individual’s network of contacts do not lead
to career advantages for that individual until several years later. If so, this is an inherent limitation
of the data and there is nothing we can really do to estimate the system consistently8.
Overall, the results of the panel estimation are nevertheless broadly supportive of our earlier
findings, in the sense that panel estimation strengthens the conclusion that male executives reap
remuneration benefits from their links while female executives do not, though the precise magnitude
of the elasticities varies from a low of just under 13% to a high of just over 55% according to the
specification and to the measure of remuneration used.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
Using both cross-section and panel estimation we have found substantial evidence that employ-
ment links matter for the remuneration of top executives and non-executive board members, in
the sense that controlling for other factors, individuals who have overlapped professionally with
a larger number of currently influential people have higher salaries and non-salary remuneration.
We have further found evidence that this effect is very different for executives as compared to
non-executive board members. For non-executives the impact of networks is large but there is
no gender difference (and no apparent gender gap in remuneration). For executives, however, the
effect of links is restricted to men. Broadly speaking, executive men in our sample do not have
more links than women, but they manage to leverage the opportunities they do have into higher
8We have experimented with different lags for the instruments and the Sargan test rejects the null in all specifi-
cations.
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remuneration while women do not. Men’s salaries are influenced by their links, with an elasticity
lying from just under 8% to 33% depending on the specification, and their liquid and total wealth
are influenced even more strongly, with elasticities of around 23% to over 61% depending on the
measure used. The effect of links on the remuneration of executive women, however, is significantly
lower than that for men, and is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Furthermore, once the
different impact of networks is taken into account, there is no further statistical evidence of a gender
gap in remuneration.
Two different types of phenomena might explain such results. First, there might exist gender
differences in preferences for social contacts or for forms of interaction with those social contacts.
For instance, as has previously been conjectured, women might be more inclined to build and rely
on a few ”strong ties”, while men might have a preference for a large number of ”weak ties”. As a
result, when considering career evolution, men will be aware of a larger number of job opportunities
than comparable women and obtain better labor market outcomes (this is exactly the ”strength
of weak ties” hypothesis of Granovetter (1973)). Alternatively, even if the structure of men’s and
women’s networks were the same, women might be less willing to approach their weak ties for
help in seeking job opportunities (this would be a variant of the ”women don’t ask” hypothesis
of Babcock and Laschever (2003)). Under either hypothesis men and women in similar initial po-
sition, and given similar numbers of opportunities to meet influential people, might end up with
very different currently employment outcomes due to their different preferences. The second type
of phenomenon might be exclusionary behavior on the part of men, whether consciously through a
preference for not admitting women to positions of real power, or unconsciously as a side effect of
the greater conspicuousness of other men among the networks of people that predominantly male
recruiters turn to when seeking to fill such positions. Either way, old boy networks may exclude
women, either through the explicit or implicit preferences of the women or the explicit or implicit
preferences of the men.
We cannot conclude from these findings which of these two phenomena is more important in
explaining our results. If the preferences of women were the sole explanation it would be hard
to see why they should not apply to non-executive women as well, whereas we can clearly reject
the hypothesis that non-executive men and women behave differently. But it does not follow that
the preferences of men are therefore the sole cause. Much more likely is that the preferences
and behaviors of women interact with those of men, and that men’s networks are more likely to
exclude women in respect of recruitment to positions of real power in the firm (there may even be a
deliberate ”window-dressing” policy on the part of some firms, to appoint women to non-executive
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positions as a substitute for appointing them to executive jobs). If so this suggests that quota
policies that fail to distinguish between executive and non-executive positions may have little effect
on the distribution of real power within firms. These suggestions remain conjectural, however, and
are an important subject for further research.
26
7 Appendix
Table 1: Network variables
Variables Description
Links-Employment Number of employment contacts with whom
the opportunity to link arose
Weighted Links-Employment Links weighted by the reciprocal of one plus the
number of years since the overlapping ended
Sex Ratio-Employment Proportion of females contacts out of all male
and female contacts
Average Job Level-Employment Average job level for executive contacts
Standard Deviation Job Level-Employment Standard deviation of job level for executive
contacts
Higher Job Level Ratio-Employment Proportion of higher job level executives
out of all executive links
Higher Board Level Ratio-Employment Proportion of higher board level board
members out of all board members contacts
Executive Ratio-Employment Proportion of executive contacts
Board Ratio-Employment Proportion of board members contacts
Number of Colleagues-Employment Number of current employment contacts
Links-Education Number of education contacts with whom
the opportunity to link arose
Number of Classmates-Education Number of education contacts who graduated
the same year in the same university for the
same degree
Links-NFP Number of non for profit organizations contacts
with whom the opportunity to link arose
Links-Other Number of other organizations contacts with whom
the opportunity to link arose
27
Table 2: Sample representativeness for 2008
Variables Our sample Whole dataset
Mean Observations Mean Observations
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Age 58.23 16 204 55.62 72 434
(9.07) (10.33)
Percentage women 8.84% 16 204 12.36% 92 278
Links 235.71 16 204 153.64 89 550
(271.91) (208.75)
Weighted links 99.46 16 204 65.12 89 550
(111.84) (87.12)
Total salary 234.37 16 204 101.83 51 598
(271.94) (201.29)
Total salary 234.37 16 204 218.80 24 014
(excluding zero total (271.94) (247.93)
salary)
Total liquid wealth 11 051.08 16 204 4 586.67 51 598
(350 748) (204 428.2)
Total liquid wealth 11 051.08 16 204 10 503.87 22 531
(excluding zero total (350 748) (309 265.5)
(liquid wealth)
Total total wealth 13 121.52 16 204 5 353.39 51 598
(351 510.3) (204 844.5)
Total total wealth 13 121.52 16 204 12 300.15 22 457
(excluding zero total (351 510.3) (310 368.5)
total wealth)
Number employees* 19 327.47 15 772 22 496.81 49 644
(73 280.41) (78 738.84)
Market capitalization* 7 893.91 15 786 9 751.39 50 146
(23 937.71) (28 477.03)
*not included in regressions (this is why the number of observations for our sample differ)
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Table 3: Determinants of salary 2008 (unweighted links)
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2004) 0.209*** 0.209***
(0.004) (0.004)
Ln links (2004) 0.088*** 0.052*** 0.050***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Female*ln links (2004) 0.024
(0.024)
Female -0.441*** -0.319*** -0.433***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.116)
Intercept -51.039*** -25.233*** -25.168***
(4.150) (3.820) (3.820)
N 16204 16204 16204
R2 0.147 0.288 0.288
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
Table 4: Determinants of salary 2008 (weighted links)
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2004) 0.209*** 0.209***
(0.004) (0.004)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.121*** 0.085*** 0.083***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Female*ln weighted links (2004) 0.018
(0.024)
Female -0.454*** -0.330*** -0.416***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.115)
Intercept -50.352*** -24.627*** -24.590***
(4.151) (3.818) (3.818)
N 16204 16204 16204
R2 0.147 0.289 0.289
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
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Table 5: Gender by executive status in 2008
Gender Non executives Executives Total
Men 7 604 7 168 14 772
(51,48%) (48,52%) (91,16%)
Women 972 460 1 432
(67,88%) (32,12%) (8,84%)
Total 8 576 7 628 16 204
(52,93%) (47,07%) (100%)
Table 6: Determinants of salary in 2008 for executives
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2004) 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.004) (0.004)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.101*** 0.091*** 0.096***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Female*ln weighted links (2004) -0.066*
(0.036)
Female -0.386*** -0.330*** -0.029
(0.042) (0.041) (0.169)
Intercept -64.752*** -57.646*** -57.825***
(5.647) (5.516) (5.516)
N 8625 8625 8625
R2 0.049 0.096 0.097
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
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Table 7: Determinants of salary in 2008 for non executives
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2004) 0.236*** 0.236***
(0.007) (0.007)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.328*** 0.209*** 0.205***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Female*ln weighted links (2004) 0.027
(0.024)
Female -0.015 -0.021 -0.151
(0.029) (0.026) (0.118)
Intercept -12.748** -3.027 -3.097
(5.561) (5.140) (5.140)
N 7578 7578 7578
R2 0.118 0.249 0.249
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
Table 8: Determinants of salary in 2008 for executives
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2004) 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.004) (0.004)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.086*** 0.075*** 0.076***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Female*ln weighted links (2004) -0.061* −0.059+ -0.063*
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Sex ratio (2004) 0.870*** 0.882*** 0.842***
(0.125) (0.122) (0.126)
Female*sex ratio (2004) 0.607
(0.487)
Female -0.133 -0.088 -0.149
(0.173) (0.168) (0.175)
Intercept -64.617*** -57.492*** -57.410***
(5.632) (5.500) (5.500)
N 8625 8625 8625
R2 0.055 0.102 0.102
Significance levels : + : 15% ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
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Table 9: Determinants of salary in 2008 for non executives
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2004) 0.236*** 0.236***
(0.007) (0.007)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.326*** 0.205*** 0.206***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Female*ln weighted links (2004) 0.042+ 0.027 0.023
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Sex ratio (2004) -0.262* 0.017 -0.034
(0.144) (0.133) (0.141)
Female*sex ratio (2004) 0.469
(0.421)
Female -0.211* -0.152 −0.187+
(0.128) (0.118) (0.122)
Intercept -13.001** -3.085 -3.038
(5.561) (5.141) (5.141)
N 7578 7578 7578
R2 0.119 0.249 0.249
Significance levels : + : 15% ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
Table 10: Determinants of salary in 2007
Variables Executives Executives Non executives Non executives
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2003) 0.104*** 0.256***
(0.004) (0.007)
Ln links (2003) 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.292*** 0.181***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Female*ln weighted -0.060* -0.070** 0.064** 0.031
links (2003) (0.033) (0.032) (0.028) (0.026)
Female -0.105 0.008 -0.322** -0.179
(0.154) (0.149) (0.138) (0.126)
Intercept -59.315*** -51.532*** -14.236** -3.9566
(5.002) (4.849) (6.192) (5.676)
N 9 896 9 896 7 479 7 479
R2 0.046 0.107 0.107 0.252
Significance levels : + : 15% ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
32
Table 11: Determinants of liquid wealth 2008 for the executive sample
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2004) 0.209***
(0.012)
Ln liquid wealth (2004) 0.301***
(0.007)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.315*** 0.292*** 0.226***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.037)
Female*ln weighted links (2004) -0.276** -0.262** -0.216**
(0.105) (0.103) (0.096)
Female 0.465 0.569 0.502
(0.490) (0.482) (0.450)
Intercept -7.140 8.999 -10.930
(15.990) (15.763) (14.675)
N 8 625 8 625 8 625
R2 0.032 0.063 0.185
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
Table 12: Determinants of total wealth 2008 for the executive sample
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2004) 0.185***
(0.015)
Ln total wealth (2004) 0.457***
(0.007)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.605*** 0.584*** 0.398***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.040)
Female*ln weighted links (2004) -0.360*** -0.356*** -0.277***
(0.127) (0.126) (0.105)
Female 1.121* 1.214** 1.075**
(0.595) (0.590) (0.491)
Intercept -37.320* -23.028 -34.048**
(19.416) (19.288) (16.021)
N 8 625 8 625 8 625
R2 0.042 0.058 0.348
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
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Table 13: Determinants of liquid wealth 2008 for the non executive sample
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2004) 0.191***
(0.021)
Ln liquid wealth (2004) 0.483***
(0.008)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.397*** 0.302*** 0.156***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.030)
Female*ln weighted links (2004) -0.062 -0.074 −0.102+
(0.080) (0.079) (0.066)
Female 0.032 0.084 0.371
(0.391) (0.389) (0.323)
Intercept 4.559 12.430 -0.232
(16.991) (16.927) (14.047)
N 7 578 7 578 7 578
R2 0.042 0.052 0.345
Significance levels : + : 15% ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
Table 14: Determinants of total wealth 2008 for the non executive sample
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ln salary (2004) 0.178***
(0.020)
Ln total wealth (2004) 0.459***
(0.008)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.547*** 0.459*** 0.271***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.029)
Female*ln weighted links (2004) 0.039 0.028 -0.047
(0.076) (0.076) (0.063)
Female -0.159 -0.110 0.270
(0.372) (0.370) (0.311)
Intercept -11.733 -4.386 -6.913
(16.170) (16.113) (13.503)
N 7 578 7 578 7 578
R2 0.061 0.070 0.345
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
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Table 15: Decomposition Results
Executives Non executives
Mean prediction (men) 5.538 4.273
Mean prediction (women) 5.234 4.188
Raw differential 0.303 0.085
Due to endowments -0.021 0.105
Due to coefficients 0.330 -0.024
Due to interaction -0.005 0.004
Table 16: Oaxaca Decomposition
Variables Executives Non executives
Men Women Men Women
Ln salary (2004) 0.090*** 0.109*** 0.240*** 0.198***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.007) (0.021)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.094*** 0.061 0.202*** 0.265***
(0.014) (0.059) (0.012) (0.032)
N 8 092 533 6679 899
R2 0.092 0.102 0.248 0.261
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
Table 17: Decomposition Results (including sex ratio)
Executives Non executives
Mean prediction (men) 5.538 4.273
Mean prediction (women) 5.234 4.188
Raw differential 0.303 0.085
Due to endowments -0.074 0.104
Due to coefficients 0.355 -0.029
Due to interaction 0.022 0.010
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Table 18: Oaxaca Decomposition (including sex ratio)
Variables Executives Non executives
Men Women Men Women
Ln salary (2004) 0.090*** 0.109*** 0.240*** 0.198***
(0.004) (0.017) (0.007) (0.021)
Ln weighted links (2004) 0.075*** 0.026 0.202*** 0.260***
(0.014) (0.060) (0.012) (0.033)
Sex ratio (2004) 0.840*** 1.588*** -0.023 0.349
(0.125) (0.531) (0.142) (0.381)
N 8 092 533 6679 899
R2 0.097 0.118 0.248 0.262
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Control not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field
Table 19: AR(1) specification for salary and links
Executives Executives Non executives Non executives
GMM diff GMM syst GMM diff GMM syst
λ1 0.727*** 0.779*** 0.911*** 0.847***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.011) (0.009)
a1 (first order
serial correlation) -7.03*** -7.06*** -21.00*** -22.76***
a2 (second order
serial correlation) 1.50+ 1.48+ -1.65* -1.69*
Sargan (p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 1 768 1 768 2 483 2 483
λ2 1.325*** 1.089*** 0.904*** 0.982***
(0.050) (0.033) (0.034) (0.028)
a1 (first order
serial correlation) -14.88*** -14.07*** -13.94*** -13.06***
a2 (second order
serial correlation) 3.29*** 3.33*** 2.43** 2.36**
Sargan (p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 1 768 1 768 2 483 2 483
Significance levels: + : 15% ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses (heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the asymptotic stan-
dard errors).
a1 and a2 test for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). They test the first-
differenced residuals.
Sargan tests the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically χ2. This test uses the minimized value of the cor-
responding two-step GMM estimators.
One-step and two-step GMM estimators are based on the same set of moment conditions, so that the overiden-
tifying restrictions are the same for both estimators.
GMM diff are one-step GMM difference estimators; GMM syst are one-step GMM system estimators.
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Table 20: Alternative GMM system estimators for executive sample
GMM (syst) GMM2 (syst) GMM (syst) GMM2 (syst)
Ln salary (t-1) 0.409*** 0.414*** 0.233*** 0.231***
(0.045) (0.048) (0.042) (0.043)
Female*ln weighted 0.026 0.021 -0.371 -0.354
links (t-1) (0.193) (0.160) (0.292) (0.266)
Male*ln weighted 0.330*** 0.221*** 0.233*** 0.129***
links (t-1) (0.061) (0.052) (0.066) (0.050)
Female 0.844 0.485 1.906* 1.448+
(0.740) (0.534) (1.074) (0.992)
Intercept 117.884*** 97.019*** 84.655*** 62.828***
(18.782) (18.807) (18.765) (15.673)
a1 (first order
serial correlation) -5.63*** -5.47*** -5.15*** -4.78***
a2 (second order
serial correlation) 1.34 1.33 1.03 1.01
Sargan
(p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dif-Sar
(p-values) 0.211 0.211
Instruments all lags all lags all lags of salary all lags of salary
for equation in diff for equation in diff
all lags of links all lags of links
for equation in diff for equation in diff
and in levels and in levels
N 1 768 1 768 1 768 1 768
Significance levels: + : 15% ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses (heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the asymptotic standard
errors).
Years dummies are included in all models. Controls not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field.
a1 and a2 test for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). They test the first-differenced
residuals.
Sargan tests the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically χ2. This test uses the minimized value of the corresponding
two-step GMM estimators. One-step and two-step GMM estimators are based on the same set of moment conditions,
so that the overidentifying restrictions are the same for both estimators.
Dif-Sar is the Difference Sargan test, which is asymptotically χ2 and tests the validity of the additional moment
conditions used in the former case.
We use GMM-style instruments for lagged salary and lagged social network (i.e. deeper lagged values); IV-style
instruments for the other regressors (i.e. available exogenous regressors or, as it is in our case, they instrument
themselves).
GMM syst are one-step GMM system estimators; GMM2 syst are two-step GMM system estimators.
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Table 21: Alternative GMM system estimators for non executive sample
GMM (syst) GMM2 (syst) GMM (syst) GMM2 (syst)
Ln salary (t-1) 0.666*** 0.666*** 0.695*** 0.689***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.025)
Female*ln weighted 0.497*** 0.360*** 0.462*** 0.312***
links (t-1) (0.091) (0.081) (0.089) (0.078)
Male*ln weighted 0.433*** 0.351*** 0.417*** 0.314***
links (t-1) (0.044) (0.039) (0.052) (0.048)
Female -0.315 -0.046 -0.234 -0.001
(0.421) (0.384) (0.409) (0.370)
Intercept 192.387*** 184.557*** 195.950*** 192.586***
(21.356) (21.538) (22.067) (22.421)
a1 (first order
serial correlation) -21.07*** -18.43*** -20.37*** -17.81***
a2 (second order
serial correlation) -0.40 -0.40 -0.34 -0.35
Sargan
(p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dif-Sar
(p-values) 0.534 0.534
Instruments all lags all lags all lags of salary all lags of salary
for equation in diff for equation in diff
all lags of links all lags of links
for equation in diff for equation in diff
and in levels and in levels
N 2 483 2 483 2 483 2 483
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses (heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the asymptotic standard
errors).
Years dummies are included in all models. Controls not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field.
a1 and a2 test for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). They test the first-differenced
residuals.
Sargan tests the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically χ2. This test uses the minimized value of the corresponding
two-step GMM estimators. One-step and two-step GMM estimators are based on the same set of moment conditions,
so that the overidentifying restrictions are the same for both estimators.
Dif-Sar is the Difference Sargan test, which is asymptotically χ2 and tests the validity of the additional moment
conditions used in the former case.
We use GMM-style instruments for lagged salary and lagged social network (i.e. deeper lagged values); IV-style
instruments for the other regressors (i.e. available exogenous regressors or, as it is in our case, they instrument
themselves).
GMM syst are one-step GMM system estimators; GMM2 syst are two-step GMM system estimators.
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Table 22: One-step GMM system estimators for liquid and total wealth
Liquid Wealth Total Wealth Liquid Wealth Total Wealth
Executives Executives Non executives Non executives
Ln salary (t-1) 0.523*** 0.369*** 0.331*** 0.318***
(0.122) (0.129) (0.065) (0.063)
Female*ln weighted -1.206 -1.448 0.412 0.427
links (t-1) (0.945) (1.012) (0.357) (0.345)
Male*ln weighted 0.520** 0.553* 0.249 0.050
links (t-1) (0.242) (0.330) (0.194) (0.190)
Female 5.878* 7.226* -0.770 -1.433
(3.469) (3.789) (1.813) (1.750)
Intercept 1 693.541*** 1 075.888*** 1 181.028*** 1 104.604***
(87.904) (76.740) (67.910) (61.075)
a1 (first order
serial correlation) -9.34*** -8.17*** -12.41*** -12.17***
a2 (second order
serial correlation) 1.77* 1.22 -2.53** -1.46
Sargan
(p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Instruments all lags of salary for equation in difference
all lags of links for equation in difference and in levels
N 1 768 1 768 2 483 2 483
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses (heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the asymptotic standard
errors).
Years dummies are included in all models. Controls not reported: age, age squared, degree, degree field.
a1 and a2 test for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). They test the first-differenced
residuals.
Sargan tests the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically χ2. This test uses the minimized value of the corresponding
two-step GMM estimators. One-step and two-step GMM estimators are based on the same set of moment conditions,
so that the overidentifying restrictions are the same for both estimators.
Dif-Sar is the Difference Sargan test, which is asymptotically χ2 and tests the validity of the additional moment
conditions used in the former case.
We use GMM-style instruments for lagged salary and lagged social network (i.e. deeper lagged values); IV-style
instruments for the other regressors (i.e. available exogenous regressors or, as it is in our case, they instrument
themselves).
GMM syst are one-step GMM system estimators; GMM2 syst are two-step GMM system estimators.
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Table 23: Network characteristics by gender for 2008
Variables Women Men
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Links - Employment 281.91 289.17 1432 231.23 269.76 14772
Mean overlap - Employment 4.31 1.74 1432 4.51 1.95 14772
Mean oldness - Employment 5.23 4.04 1432 5.76 4.67 14772
Weighted mean overlap - Employment 2.29 1.48 1432 2.40 1.69 14772
Weighted links - Employment 125.22 129.95 1432 96.96 109.61 14772
Sex ratio - Employment 0.14 0.07 1431 0.11 0.07 14770
Executive ratio - Employment 0.81 0.10 1432 0.79 0.12 14772
Board ratio - Employment 0.40 0.16 1432 0.44 0.18 14772
Number of colleagues - Employment 99.40 114.05 1432 76.83 97.04 14772
Links - Education 61.59 64.89 1010 51.98 55.68 8796
Number of classmates - Education 4.69 6.21 1010 4.21 5.95 8796
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Table 25: Job characteristics by gender for 2008 (proportions)
Variables Women Men
Job level: CEO 0.04 0.15
Job level: CFO 0.06 0.07
Job level: Chairman 0.01 0.08
Job level: Board Director 0.66 0.43
Job level: Director 0.05 0.07
Job level: Vice President 0.10 0.10
Job function: Board 0.68 0.51
Job function: Finance 0.08 0.11
Job function: Law 0.04 0.03
Job function: Operations 0.02 0.04
Job function: Sales 0.03 0.03
42
T
ab
le
26
:
A
ve
ra
ge
fi
rm
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
b
y
ge
n
d
er
fo
r
20
08
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
W
o
m
e
n
M
e
n
M
e
d
ia
n
M
e
a
n
S
td
.
D
e
v
.
N
M
e
d
ia
n
M
e
a
n
S
td
.
D
e
v
.
N
N
u
m
b
er
of
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
6
77
7.
5
25
82
1.
36
73
21
8.
73
1
41
2
4
00
0
18
68
8.
93
73
25
7.
94
14
36
0
M
ar
ke
t
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
2
22
3
11
45
7.
66
30
68
8.
71
1
40
9
1
44
6
7
54
4.
65
23
14
2.
35
14
37
7
43
Table 27: Firm characteristics by gender for 2008 (proportions)
Variables Women Men
Sector: Finance 0.18 0.16
Sector: Manufacturing 0.27 0.26
Sector: Information 0.10 0.11
Sector: Trade 0.09 0.07
Sector: Services 0.07 0.08
Table 28: Network characteristics by executive status for 2008
Variables Executives Non executives
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Links - Employment 188.28 226.54 7628 277.90 300.45 8576
Mean overlap- Employment 4.59 2.09 7628 4.41 1.77 8576
Mean oldness - Employment 5.61 4.68 7628 5.80 4.56 8576
Weighted mean overlap - Employment 2.53 1.83 7628 2.25 1.51 8576
Weighted links - Employment 79.76 97.97 7628 116.98 120.19 8576
Sex ratio - Employment 0.11 0.08 7625 0.12 0.06 8576
Executive ratio - Employment 0.78 0.13 7628 0.80 0.11 8576
Board ratio - Employment 0.45 0.19 7628 0.42 0.17 8576
Number of colleagues - Employment 64.58 89.50 7628 91.49 104.91 8576
Links - Education 49.35 51.12 4033 55.50 60.27 5773
Number of classmates - Education 3.71 5.22 4033 4.63 6.43 5773
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Table 31: Firm characteristics by executive status for 2008 (proportions)
Variables Executives Non executives
Sector: Finance 0.15 0.18
Sector: Manufacturing 0.27 0.26
Sector: Information 0.12 0.11
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